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White people earn more money than non-whites . This is 
true in most cases even if non-white people perform the 
same job as white people. Are there reasons for these 
differences? The purpose of this paper is to discover what 
those reasons are for the differences in wages and to 
attempt to discover how much of the difference is really 
discrimination. Any inequalities that are unexplained may 
be considered by the author to be discriminatory. 
Therefore, the hypothesis for this paper is: Income 
differences between whites and non-whites may be attributed 
in part to race discrimination. 
The statistical method used will be ordinary least 
square. This will allow the author to run a regression and 
observe what the correlation or relationship is between the 
dependent and the independent variables. The regression 
equation for this model will be 
y , = A+ B1X1 + B2X2 +RX, + B.X; + BsXs + B6X6 +Cl . 
This is saying that the income ratio between non -
whites and whites, (Y) , is a function of the ratios of 
percentages of median education levels of non-whites and 
whites, Ed, (Xl); the ratio of non-whites and whites who 
are married, Marital, (X2); the ratio of the number of non-
whites and whites living in an urban area of at least 
50,000 or more people, Urban, (X3); the mobility of non -
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whites to whites, Mob, (X4); the ratio of the unemployment 
rate of non-whites and whites, Unem, (XS) ; the ratio of the 
number of non-whites and whites employed in manufacturing 
in thousands, Ind, (X6 . 81 -~ are the partial regression 
coefficients for variables one through six . 
The final model (which included the mobility of non-whites, 
manufacturing, and martial statistics ratios of non-whites 
and whites) accounted for 55.85 percent of the income 
differences between the white and black races. The 
remaining 44.15 percent that was not accounted for may be 
due to discrimination. However, the remaining proportion 
could also be caused by the absence of other significant 
variables that were not used by this model or it could be 
caused by random factors. 
I would like to thank the professors in the Economics 
Department at Eastern Illinois University for all of their 
help. Specifically I would like to thank Dr. Harold Nordin, 
Dr. Minh Quang Dao, Dr. Lawrence Bates, Dr. Ebrahim 
Karbassioon and Dr. William Thompson . Their assistance was 
invaluable . 
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INTRODUCTION 
White people earn more money than non-whites. This is 
true in most cases even if non-white people perform the same 
job as white people. Are there reasons for these differences? 
The purpose of this paper is to discover what those reasons 
are for the differences in wages and to attempt to discover 
how much of the difference is really discrimination . Any 
inequalities that are unexplained may be considered by the 
author to be discriminatory. Therefore, the hypothesis for 
this paper is : Income differences between whites and non-
whites may be attributed in part to r ace discrimination . 
The topic of job discrimination has received much 
attention over the last few years because it can affect 
society as a whole. Job discrimination is very harmful to the 
group of people that it is being practiced against . It is 
important to educate people so that they will be aware of job 
discrimination and not practice it. 
Discrimination is making a distinction in favor of or 
against a person or thing on the basis of the group, c l ass, or 
category to which the person or thing belongs, rather than 
according to actual merit. Discrimination also is treatment 
or consideration of, or making a distinction in favor of or 
against, a person or thing based on the group, class, or 
category to which that person or thing belongs rather than on 
individual merit. 
Discrimination can be good or bad. This article will be 
confined to discrimination when it is used in a way that is 
hurtful against certain people or groups of people. 
Discrimination and specifically job discrimination exists 
because people would rather not hire a person or group of 
people because of their race, creed, color, or religion just 
because they do not care to be associated with that person or 
group . It may be because of a belief that people in that 
particular group are unintelligent, or that they may be lazy, 
or some other unsubstantiated reason. 
Dr. Gary Becker's book, The Economics of Discrimination 
assumed that people had "tastes for discrimination" and these 
tastes are the most immediate cause of actual discrimination. 
A "taste for discrimination" is when an employer, employee, or 
a consumer decides that he or she wants to discriminate and 
then that person does exactly that. To put it very simply, 
that person that is discriminating is acting rationally in 
their own eyes. They are acting in what they consider to be 
their best interests. "A person who has a 'taste for 
discrimination ' also acts like he is willing to receive less 
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income in order to act the way that he does. This is because 
when a person who has a 'taste for discrimination' does so, he 
increases his marginal utility when he prevents blacks from 
working with him. 11 (Becker, 1957, p. 16) 
When an employer discriminates against 
employees, he acts as if he incurs non-pecuniary, 
psychic costs of production by employing them; when 
an employee discriminates against fellow employees 
or employers, he acts as if he incurs non-
pecuniary, psychic costs of employment by working 
with them; when a consumer discriminates against 
products, he acts as if he incurs non-pecuniary, 
psychic costs of consumption by consuming them. 
(Becker, 1957, p. 122) 
According to Becker, an employer discriminates when he or 
she refuses to hire someone with a marginal value product 
greater than marginal cost . Also, he believes that 
discrimination is a function of employers' tastes, production 
functions, the amount of competition relative to monopoly, and 
the amount employed. 
Dr. Becker devised what he called a discrimination 
coefficient. The discrimination coefficient measured the 
amount or value of the discrimination. Dr. Becker discussed 
employer or job discrimination, consumer discrimination, and 
government discrimination. This part of the Review of the 
Literature will discuss Dr. Becker's coverage of job 
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discrimination. 
It was Dr. Becker's belief that the theories of 
international trade could be used to discuss the costs of job 
discrimination. It is believed that countries are better off 
if they have free trade. Countries will suffer a loss of 
income if there are barriers to free trade . 
This belief can be applied to two races, the black and 
the white races. It is in the best interests for both races 
to trade with each other without discrimination or trade 
barriers. This is similar to two countries with one being 
labor abundant and the other being capital abundant. These 
two races should trade with each other until the marginal 
product of each input is equal. This would maximize the 
incomes for both races. But discrimination prevents the 
marginal products of both inputs from becoming equal. This 
causes the income for both races to be reduced. Therefore, it 
would seem that both races would want to avoid discrimination . 
Lester Thurow disagreed with Becker. According to 
Thurow, if Becker's theory is correct, then the empirical 
results about discrimination and income are incorrect. In 
fact, it is Becker's belief that if discrimination did lower 
income, then most rational people could be persuaded to stop 
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discriminating. Thurow felt that white society could 
discriminate and not lose income. The white society is the 
society that is in power. Therefore, this society would be 
able to make laws that would allow them to discriminate 
against a certain society (the black society, for instance), 
and not lose income . Thurow called this monopoly power . 
Thurow said that the "discrimination coefficient" 
that Becker developed was the same as a tariff in trade 
between two countries. Thurow felt that whites could and 
did benefit from discrimination. In fact, it was 
possible, that if the optimal tariff or "discrimination 
coefficient" could be determined, then the income levels 
of the whites (discriminators) could be increased. 
(Thurow, 1969, pp. 113, 115) 
Thurow believed that if the discriminators were 
prejudiced and because of circumstances were not able to 
discriminate beforehand, then being allowed to discriminate 
would increase their utility, because they would have to 
associate with fewer non-whites. 
Thurow felt that since non-whites had a higher share of 
unemployment relative to the amount of non-whites in the work 
force, then the number of whites employed and therefore their 
incomes would increase. (Thurow, 1969, p. 118) 
This is a reasonable assumption. If non-whites were 
going to be denied jobs, then it would seem reasonable that 
those jobs would go to whites . Therefore, Thurow would seem 
to be right in this case. 
A policy prescription for reducing 
discrimination is to remove government 
discrimination s i nce it is t he most effective 
weapon to create and remove the monopoly power 
behind the different kinds of discrimination. 
(Carson, 1974, p.9) 
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Thurow's prescription for eliminating or reducing 
discrimination is simple in theory, but very difficult to 
implement. It is next to impossible to get rid of all 
government discrimination. Why? Because politicians run the 
government and politicians do not always do what is best for 
the country but what is best for their constituents or 
themselves. 
Thurow felt that there were seven types of discrimination 
against non-whites . They are: 
1. Employment discrimination - causing non-whites to suffer 
a large amount of unemployment relative to their numbers in 
the work force. This is accomplished by placing non-whites in 
occupations and areas where unemployment is expected to be 
high. 
2. Wage discrimination - non-whites r eceive less than their 
fair share in wages relative to their contribution to total 
output. 
3 . Occupational discrimination - non-whites are placed in 
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low-wage occupations. 
4. Human capital discrimination - government investment in 
black education and training is less than the investment in 
white education and training. 
5. Capital discrimination - non-whi tes are not allowed equal 
access to capital (for example, being denied loans for no 
apparent reason) . Also they are prevented from efficiently 
using the capital that they have acquired. This can be 
accomplished by refusing to sell a piece of property to a 
black person because he or she is black. 
6. Monopoly power discrimination - non-whites are prevented 
from entering occupations where monopoly power allows higher 
returns (non-whites are unequally represented in unions) . 
7. Price discrimination - non-whites must pay higher prices 
for some things (discrimination in the housing market) 
(Thurow, 1969, pp . 117-125) 
Marcus Alexis looked at the motivations (particularly the 
one involved with Becker's assumption that whites did not want 
to be around non-whites) that cause people to discriminate in 
the work force. He felt that whites would rather see the 
incomes of other whites increased rather than the incomes of 
blacks . (Marshall, 1974, p . 841) 
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Barbara Bergmann discovered that discrimination can cause 
occupations requiring equal skill to have different pay 
scales. She felt this was possible because there are varying 
degrees of discrimination in different occupations. She used 
two occupations requiring equal skills, but she assumed that 
one was prestigious and the other was not . She found that 
occupational segregation, or the practice of putting non-
whites into limited occupations, caused the differences of 
income. (Marshall, 1974, p. 853) 
Although Kenneth Arrow's paper "The Theory of 
Discrimination" assumed that the productivity of both black 
and white were equal and was similar to both Becker's and 
Thurow's assumption of equal productivities, he used 
neoclassical assumptions of utility and prof it maximization to 
do a study on discrimination. 
After accounting f or productivity, Arrow wanted to 
discover the reason for the differences in wages between non-
whites and whites. He wanted to explain discrimination 
without " ... lumping social factors into an uninformative 
category of imperfections or jumping to a precipitate 
rejection of neoclassical theory." (Marshall, 1974, p. 853) 
Arrow started with a simple case of employer 
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discrimination. He felt that if an employer had a taste for 
discrimination, then the marginal utility of black labor would 
be negative. This would cause non-whites to suffer a loss of 
income. Arrow also felt that discrimination is also costly to 
the firm, in fact, he felt that it acted as a tax. 
(Ashenfelter and Rees, 1973, p. 9) 
Arrow also prepares an alternative model to 
employer discrimination; in this case, the 
employer's action is not based on tastes, but 
perceptions of reality. If employers believe black 
workers are less productive than white workers, 
they will hire blacks only if the wage of blacks < 
wage of whites. This finding is based on three 
assumptions: 1) the employer can distinguish 
between black workers and white workers; 2) the 
employer must incur some cost before it is possible 
to determine the employee's true productivity; and 
3) the employer has some conception of the 
distribution of productivities within the black and 
white groups of workers. (Marshall, 1974, p. 855) 
Unlike the national studies above, John H. Carson wrote 
The Economics of Racial Discrimination in Louisiana: 1950 -
1971 which focused on the employment opportunities of blacks 
in Louisiana. Carson identified the important factors of 
discrimination and discussed how these factors helped or 
hindered the economic progress of non-whites in Louisiana 
during this period. Carson focused on both source and form. 
Source refers to the people who are the cause of the 
discrimination and form refers to the way that the 
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discrimination was practiced . 
Carson determined that in the 1950's, black relative to 
white income decreased. He felt that non-whites were 
discriminated against a great deal more than whites were 
discriminated against . 
But starting in the 60's and continuing to the 70 ' s, 
black income increased relative to white income. Carson felt 
that discrimination against non-whites decreased during this 
period. 
He theorized that these decreases were caused by legal, 
moral and political pressures that were applied during the 
60's. But, even though gains were made, wage discrimination 
still existed in Louisiana . (Carson, 1974, p . 1, 48) 
Unlike the previous paper, Herbert Hill's essay entitled 
"Black Labor and Affirmative Action: An Historical 
Perspective" discussed how non-whites were treated by labor 
unions. Hill also wrote about Affirmative Action and whether 
it should include quotas. 
He felt that quotas were essential; without them, there 
would be no way to measure the progress of blacks in their 
fight against job discrimination. (Shulman and Darity, 1989, 
p. 248) 
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Orley Ashenfelter 1 s article, "Discrimination and Trade 
Skills" differed from Hill's model in that it was concerned 
with the means of discrimination. He measured the effects of 
trade union discrimination on non-whites and females by using 
the ratio of black to white wages. 
Ashenfelter 1 s results showed that there was a higher 
black to white wage ratio in industries (unskilled labor) 
where labor unions were present. But at the same time, he 
also discovered that in markets organized by craft unions, 
(skilled labor) the wage ratio was similar to the black -
white wage ratios in craft markets in unorganized labor 
markets. Therefore he concluded that trade unions did very 
little for the black - white wage differentials. (Ashenfelter, 
and Rees, 1973, pp . 66-67) 
A paper written by Finis Welch, "Education and Racial 
Discrimination", maintained there had been more discrimination 
of non-whites in education than in the overall labor market. 
Welch felt that this discrimination in education resulted in 
lower wages and fewer jobs in their labor market. 
Welch also felt that employee discrimination also caused 
non-whites to receive lower wages relative to the wages that 
whites received . He believed that white employees preferred 
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to work with other white employees rather than black 
employees. Because of this, employers hired more white 
employees because they believed that the white employees would 
be more productive working beside other whites. Therefore, 
(according to this belief), black employees would be paid less 
because they were worth less. (Marshall, 1974,p. 853) 
Finis Welch uses a model similar to Becker's 
to demonstrate that discrimination is caused more 
by employee preferences for working with members of 
their own race than by employer "taste for 
discrimination". If a worker's wage is a 
decreasing function of the proportion of that 
worker ' s race in the firm's work force, it is 
possible to show that cost minimization in 
competitive equilibrium requires total segregation 
within a work force rather than combinations of 
black and white workers receiving different wages, 
as implied by Becker's model. 
Much of the work on the economics of 
discrimination assumes blacks and whites to be 
perfect substitutes. However, Welch and others 
point out that blacks might be complementary to 
white workers, making segregation impossible. This 
would be the case, for example, if white foremen 
worked with all - black work forces and required a 
premium to do so equal to a coefficient of 
discrimination. This would increase the employer ' s 
cost of hiring blacks, who could therefore only be 
hired if wages of blacks < wages of whites. 
(Marshall, 1974, p. 853) 
In another paper about the means of discrimination, 
"Career Wage Mobility", James P. Smith pointed out that black 
men were not allowed to get jobs with growth potential because 
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of discriminating forces. Smith also discovered that while 
black men consistently earned less money than white men, the 
wage differential decreased in every decade except the 1970's, 
from the 1940's through the 1980's. 
Smith used data from published census data using 
occupational distributions of the work force. (Shulman and 
Darity, 1989, pp. 109-125) 
"Racial Differentials in Male Unemployment Rates: 
Evidence from Low-Income Urban Areas" was written by Duane 
Leigh and V. Lane Rawlins. Leigh and Rawlins tried to 
discover how important race and age were in the determination 
of racial differences in the employment rate of males 16-21 
and 22-34 living in low-income areas . The Census Employment 
Survey was used as a source . They found that race 
discrimination explained approximately 50 per cent of the 
differences in the unemployment rates of non-whites and 
whites. Leigh and Rawlins concluded that non-whites are mainly 
limited to the secondary market of employment and are the 
first to become unemployed. 
150-157) 
(Leigh and Rawlins, 1974, pp. 
George Borjas penned an article entitled "The Measurement 
of Race and Gender Wage Differentials: Evidence from the 
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Federal Sector 11 • Borjas discussed wage differentials in 
government agencies that are based on race and sex. He 
grouped all of the government agencies into one large firm. 
His goal was to prove that race and sex differentials could 
help in the measuring and interpreting of wage differentials. 
He discovered that federal agencies usually had both large 
race and sex differentials. 
Borjas's article showed that even in federal agencies 
there is some measure of sex and racial discrimination. 
Borjas also felt that the low relative wage of black 
women was due to the fact that they were females and not 
because they were black. He also discovered that women in the 
work force accounted for no more than 25 per cent of the 
unexplained general wage differential in federal agencies. 
(Borjas, 1983, pp. 79-91) 
"Race and Human Capital" by James Smith, asked if human 
skills differences between non-whites and whites decreased 
during the late twentieth century, why did income ratios only 
start decreasing in the 1960's? Smith used data on 
education, literacy, jobs and income starting from 1890. He 
concluded that even though education incomes of both whites 
and non-whites increased, the increase was greater for whites. 
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Starting in the late 1960 's, black income increased more 
relative to white income. This was caused by a relat i ve 
increase in the human capital of b l acks which resulted in 
their relative earnings also increasing . (Smith, 1984, pp. 
685 - 698) 
"Race and Gender Wage Inequality in Services and 
Manufacturing" was written by Edward Montgomery and William 
Wascher. This article looked at the amount and source of race 
and gender wage differentials in the service and manufacturing 
sectors. Montgomery and Wascher found that the unexplained 
wage differential between non-whites and whites was 
approximately 50% lower in the service sector. While the 
discriminating differential or wage gap has decreased in the 
service sector, non-whites, minorities, or f emales are not 
better off. Thi s is because average wages are lower in the 
service sector. (Montgomery and Wascher, 1987, pp 284 -289) 
George Borjas article "Race, Turnover, and Male Earnings" 
discussed racial differences in turnover rates, monetary 
consequences of turnover, and the effects o f turnover on the 
racial wage differential. He found that young white males 
were more likely to quit their jobs than young black males, 
but that there was no difference in turnover between mature 
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(45-59 years old) black and white males. Borjas discovered 
that a young white male who kept the same job for two years 
received a 32 . 9 cent increase in wages for the two year 
period; however, a young black male onl y received a 24 . 5 cent 
increase. Mature white males who stayed on the same job for 
two years also gained more than mature black males. He also 
showed that the change in the discrimi natory differential was 
8.5 cents . (Borjas, "Race, Turnover, and Male Earnings" 1984, 
pp. 73-89) 
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Alan Blinders article "Wage Discrimination: Reduced Form 
and Structural Estimates" attempted to discover how much of 
the black-white differences in wages is because of the better 
education that whites receive. He discovered that about 60 % 
of the black-white difference can be accounted for by the 
education difference. (Blinder, 1973, pp. 436 - 455) 
"Faculty Salaries: Is There Discrimination by Sex, Race, 
and Discipline?" is a study that was written by Nancy Gordon, 
Thomas E. Morton, and Ina C. Braden. The purpose of this 
study was to see how much of a relationship there was between 
salary and explanatory variables such as age, education, race 
and sex. The data for this study came from a large urban 
university. Only full-time academic employees were used. 
Salary was estimated to be a function of race, years at 
the university, education level, age, and department. This 
estimate was done twice, once with men and women separated and 
once with all of the full-time academic employees together, 
with sex as another independent variable. 
Gordon, Morton, and Braden discovered that black men and 
women both earned considerably more than similar white men and 
women. The amounts were 14% more for black men and 7 . 5% more 
for black women. They felt that the reason for this was 
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because of the high demand for black professors and the small 
number of black professors that were available. (Gordon, 
Morton, and Braden, 1974, pp. 419-427} 
The purpose of "Racial Discrimination in American 
Industry" was to measure the amount of racial discrimination 
and to study the relationship between industry profits and 
discrimination. It was written by William S. Comanor. 
An increase in profitability from 8 per cent 
to 12 per cent after taxes would be associated with 
an increase in the industry discrimination 
coefficient by eight percentage points. (Comanor, 
1974, p . 377} 
Comanor's study showed that discrimination was pretty 
much the norm in the American economy. He showed that 
discrimination increased when profits increased. In fact, his 
study suggested there was more discrimination in the skilled 
job market and the more profitable industries. (Comanor, 1973, 
pp . 3 6 3 - 3 7 8 ) 
The previous studies examined discrimination, why people 
discriminated and the effect of that discrimination on both 
the one being discriminated against and the one doing the 
discrimination. 
This study will be different from those cited in that the 
author's purpose is to try to determine why there are income 
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differences between whites and non-whites. Data such as 
education levels and marital status will be used to explain 
why these differences exist. Since the Review of the 
Literature is concerned with the discrimination of nonwhites 
and not discrimination by sex or discipline, only information 
about race will be discussed. 
EXPLANATION OF THE VARIABLES 
AND RESULTS OF TESTS PERFORMED 
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The statistical method used will be ordinary least 
square. This will allow the author to run a regression and 
observe what the correlation or relationship is between the 
dependent and the independent variables . 
A regression is a formula used to find what effect one or 
more things (independent variables) have on something else 
(dependent variable, in this case income differentials). The 
regression assumes that only one independent variable changes 
at a time. The other variables will remain constant . The 
regression equation for this model will be 
Y, = A+ B,X, + B2X2 + B1X1 + B,X, + BsXs + B6X6 + E, • 
This is saying that the income ratio between non-whites 
and whites, (Y), is a function of the ratios of percentages of 
median education levels of non-whites and whites, Ed, (Xl); 
the ratio of non-whites and whites who are married, Marital, 
(X2); the ratio of the number of non-whites and whites living 
in an urban area of at least 50,000 or more people, Urban, 
(X3); the mobility of non-whites to whites, Mob, (X4); the 
ratio of the unemployment rate of non-whites and whites, Unem, 
(XS); the ratio of the number of non-whites and whites 
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employed in manufacturing in thousands, Ind, (X6) . B, - ·· are 
the partial regression coefficients for variables one through 
six. 
The constant, A, is the intercept, and is expected to be 
positive. 
The dependent variable, the ratio of non-white to white 
median income will be less than one if white median income 
exceeds non-white median income and greater than one if white 
median income is less than non-white median income. Over the 
period in question, the ratio of non-white median income to 
white income remained relatively constant. The regression 
equation embodies a hypotheses concerning what affects this 
ratio. The ratio of non-white to white income should be 
directly or positively related to variable one, ED, the ratio 
of non-white to white education. As non-white education 
approaches that of whites, their median income should rise 
relative to white median income. Since financial needs are 
greater in families, incomes should be higher among the 
married. Thus the ratio of non-white to white median income 
should be directly related to X2, or MART, the marriage ratio. 
As the percentage of non-whites that are married approaches 
that of whites, non-white median income should rise relative 
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to white median income. Families living in urban centers 
should earn more than their rural counterparts. Thus the 
ratio of non-white to white median income should rise as the 
ratio of non-white to white urban families, URBAN, rises. The 
next variable, MOB or X4, is a dummy variable. Dummy 
variables have only two values, zero and one. This value of 
thi s variable will be zero from 1960 through 1964. 
Thereafter, its value will be one. The reasoning for this is 
that The Civil Rights Act of 1964 went into effect in 1965. 
Therefore, it became illegal to deny someone a job because of 
the color of his or her skin. The ratio of non-white to white 
median income should rise because the mobility of non-whites 
increased relative to that of whites, because non-white 
families would be able to move where jobs are best. The ratio 
of non-white to white median income should be inversely 
related to the unemployment ratio, UNEM, variable XS. As 
unemployment increases among non-whites, their incomes should 
decrease relative to white income. The ratio of non-white to 
white median income should also be positively related to the 
manufacturing ratio, X6, IND . As the number of non-whites 
working in manufacturing rises relative to the number of 
whites, non-white income should increase relative to white 
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income. 
The rat i o of median black education levels compared to 
median white education levels ranged from 75 percent in 1960 
to 98 percent in 1990 . The ratio of unemployment rates 
between the races remained fairly constant. While there was 
some variation during the years, from 1960 through 1990 the 
ratio was approximately two times as many non -whites 
unemployed as to whites. In 1960, the ratio of black 
employment in the manufacturing industry was 83 percent of the 
white employment level. By 1990 the ratio had risen to a 
level of 120 percent. Marital levels between the two races 
ranged from 87 percent in 1960 to 60 percent in 1990. The 
ratio of non-whites compared to whites residing in urban areas 
rose from 104 percent in 1960 to 120 percent in 1990. This 
means that according to the author's predictions, ED, MOB, IND 
and URBAN should have caused the income ratio to move closer 
to one while UNEM and MART should have decreased that ratio. 
The estimated regression f o r this model is: 
Y = 0.57 - o.02x,, + o.11xv - o.11x., + o.01x .. + o.o ix., - o.o ix .. , 
SUMMARY 
OUTPUT 
Regression 
Statistics 
Multiple R 
R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Standard Error 
Observations 
ANOVA 
Regression 
Residual 
Total 
Intercept 
X1ED 
X2MART 
X3URBAN 
X4MOB 
X5UNEM 
X61ND 
*(-0.10) (0.53) 
0.756592 
0.572432 
0.465540 
0.019765 
31 
df 
6 
24 
30 
Coefficients 
0.571806 
-0.016325 
0.107523 
-0.105987 
0.067188 
0.007431 
-0.010045 
SS 
0.012553 
0.009376 
0.021929 
Standard 
Error 
0.385341 
0.157238 
0.204449 
0.215055 
0.014343 
0.030164 
0.018515 
*T-statistics 
(-0.49) (4.68) (0.25) (-0.54) 
MS 
0.002092 
3.90686E 
t Stat 
1.483893 
-0.103824 
0.525918 
-0.492835 
4 .684172 
0.246361 
-0.542552 
F Significance F 
5.355248 0.001247 
P-value Lower95% 
0.150852 -0.223500 
0.918171 -0.340849 
0.603770 -0.314438 
0.626607 -0.549840 
9.27024E 0.037584 
0.807497 -0.054825 
0.592441 -0.048258 
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Upper95% 
1.367112 
0.308199 
0.529486 
0.337866 
0.096791 
0.069688 
0.028167 
The first test was for multicollinearity . 
Multicollinearity is a problem if any of the independent 
variables are significantly correlated with any other 
independent variable. That is to say if the relationship 
between the thing that is being measured (Y) and one of the 
variables that is being used to see the effect it has on Y, 
Marital for example, is greater than the relationship between 
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any two independent variables, Unem and Marital for example, 
multicollinearity does not exist. 
A correlation matrix was formed. Using the formula of "r 
divided by the square root of 1 minus r squared divided by n-
2tt produces a t statistic. This is where r is the sample 
correlation between any pair of independent variables . This 
t statistic was then compared to the t table. Any calculated 
t statistic larger than the corresponding number in the t 
table would indicate the presence of multicollinearity. 
Multicollinearity does exist in this model. Severe 
multicollinearity does exist in this model. In fact, the 
multicollinearity problem could have caused some of the signs 
of the regression's coefficients to be reversed. The 
following table is the correlation matrix. 
X1ED X2MART X3URBAN X4MOB X5UNEM X6/ND y 
X1ED 1 
X2MART ·0.959437 1 
X3URBAN 0.952146 -0.941246 1 
X4MOB 0.593584 -0.605437 0.557640 1 
X5UNEM 0.529550 -0.613734 0.490670 0.067804 1 
X61ND 0.488234 -0.526915 0.533501 0.174918 0.607749 1 
y 
-0.090467 0.086889 -0.133985 0.534924 -0.301809 -0.243888 
-18.32678 
-15.00873 -15.00873 
3.971993 3.617696 3.617696 
3.361767 -4.186210 3.032484 0.365983 
3.012698 -3.338592 3.396779 0.956716 4.121286 
-0.489189 0.469692 -0.728098 3.409468 -1 .704793 -1 .354273 
Autocorrelation is the next test. It occurs when 
the error terms in one year affects the size of the error 
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terms in other years. 
The most reliable way to check autocorrelation is to use 
the Durbin-Watson Statistic. The Durbin-Watson Statistic is 
a measurement of autocorrelation in this model. At the 0.05 
level of significance the test for autocorrelation is 
inconclusive since the Durbin-Watson Statistic of 1.77802 is 
greater than the dl value of 1.09 and less than the du value 
of 1. 84. There is a possibility that the model has an 
autocorrelation problem . 
The third test was for heteroscedasticity. It is a 
violation of the assumption that the error terms have the same 
variance. Error terms can be defined as any other random 
factors other than the independent variables that may affect 
the value of the dependent variable. 
A Chi-square t est was performed to test for 
heteroscedasticity. The residuals (the differences between 
the actual values of the dependent variable and its predicted 
or fitted values) were found and then squared. A least 
squares regression was performed on the data using the 
residuals squared as the dependent variable and the predicted 
value of the dependent variable as the independent variable. 
After the least squares regression is performed, the R-squared 
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value is multiplied by the number of observations. This 
number is then compared to the Chi-squared value from the 
table using one degree of freedom. If the value given by the 
model is less than the value in the table, heteroscedasticity 
is not present. The table value is at the O. 05 level is 
43.773. In this model, the calculated Chi-squared value is 
14.77056. As a result, heteroscedasticity is not a problem in 
this model. 
Another test was the F-test. This test is used to check 
the overall significance of the regression model. It lets the 
user know if there is a linear relationship between the 
dependent variable and at least one of the independent 
variables. The F-test statistic for this model is 5.355249 
which is larger than the critical F-statistic 0.05 level which 
lS 2.5082. This test shows that there is a linear 
relationship between the dependent variable and one of the 
independent variables. This is an important conclusion. This 
is confirmed by the significance F-statistic which is 
0.001248. 
In this equation, ED or Xl had a negative influence on 
the dependent variable Y. As stated earlier, this could have 
been caused by the multicollinearity problem. However, this 
28 
is not what the sign of the coefficient of this variable was 
expected to be. For every one percent increase in ED (with 
all the other independent variables held constant), Y will 
decrease by 0.01633 percent. 
Mart or X2 was also expected to have a positive influence 
on the dependent variable. It had the correct sign. Y will 
increase by 0.107524 percent if Mart increases by one percent. 
URBAN or X3 was the second variable that had the opposite 
influence on Y than was expected. An increase of one percent 
in URBAN will cause a O . 10599 decrease in the dependent 
variable. 
MOB or X4's expectation was indeterminate because while 
job mobility allows non-whites to move where jobs are best, it 
could also be an indicator of poor job security. In this 
regression it has a positive influence on Y. However, since 
this is a dummy variable, MOB will not increase. Overall, MOB 
caused the income ratio to increase by 0.067188 percent . 
The expectation of UNEM or XS was that it would have a 
negative influence on income differences between non-whites 
and whites . This expectation was incorrect. When UNEM 
increases by one percent, then Y will increase by 0.007431 
percent. 
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It was incorrectly assumed that IND or X6 would have a 
positive influence on the dependent variable of Y. An 
increase of one percent in IND will cause a 0.01005 percent 
decrease in the dependent variable. 
In this equation the only significant variable is MOB. A 
second regression was run without ED. This independent 
variable was dropped because it was the most least significant 
variable of the first regression. The new equation is: 
Y. = 0.562 + O. l l 8X,, - O. l l 7Xi. + 0.067X,, + 0.008X .. - 0.0 l OX,,, . 
* (0.68) (-0.63) (4.78) (0.25) (-0.55) 
SUMMARY 
OUTPUT 
Regression 
Statistics 
Multiple R 0.756465 
R Square 0.572240 
Adjusted R 0.486688 
Square 
Standard Error 0.019370 
Observations 31 
ANOVA 
d( SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 5 0.012549 0.002509 6.688811 4.42071E 
Residual 25 0.009380 3.75227E 
Total 30 0.021929 
Coefficients Standard t Stat P-value Lower95% Upper95% 
Error 
Intercept 0.561710 0.365419 1.537164 0.136814 -0.190885 1.314306 
X2MART 0.117995 0.174285 0.677022 0.504608 -0.240952 0.476943 
X3URBAN -0.116622 0.185314 -0.629321 0.534848 -0.498284 0.265039 
X4MOB 0.067122 0.014043 4.779691 6.59471 E 0.038199 0.096044 
X5UNEM 0.007487 0.029557 0.253309 0.802100 -0.053386 0.068361 
X61ND -0.009807 0.018005 -0.544688 0.590793 -0.046890 0.027275 
*T-statistic 
This caused the Adjusted R-square to increase from 0.4655 
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to 0.4866. Therefore, ED will remain out of the model . 
A third regression was run without UNEM. This 
independent variable was dropped because it was the second 
least significant variable from the first regression. The new 
regression is: 
Y = 0.624 + 0.089X,, - 0.139X 2. + 0.065X,, -0.008XJ, . 
*{0.69 ) ( -0 .88) (5.47 ) (-0.49) 
SUMMARY 
OUTPUT 
Regression 
Statistics 
Multiple R 
R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Standard Error 
Observations 
AN OVA 
Regression 
Residual 
Total 
Intercept 
X2MART 
X3URBAN 
X4MOB 
X61ND 
0.755739 
0.571142 
0.505164 
0.019018 
31 
df 
4 
26 
30 
Coefficients 
0.623983 
0.088769 
-0.139323 
0.065345 
-0.007680 
*T-statistic 
SS 
0.012525 
0.009404 
0.021929 
Standard 
Error 
0.265451 
0.128256 
0.159257 
0.011945 
0.015637 
MS 
0.003131 
3.61722E 
t Stat 
2.350649 
0.692126 
-0.874831 
5.470380 
-0.491123 
F Significance F 
8.656553 1.39840E 
P-value Lower95% 
0.026603 0.078339 
0.494993 -0.174865 
0.389675 -0.466682 
9.75463E 0.040791 
0.627459 -0.039824 
Upper95% 
1.169627 
0.352403 
0.188035 
0.089899 
0.024464 
One again the adjusted r-square increased from 0.4866 to 
0.505 when UNEM was removed from the regression. It too, will 
no longer be a part of the model . 
A fourth regression was run without URBAN. This 
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independent variable was dropped because it was the third 
least significant variable from the first regression. The new 
regression is: 
y = 0.398 + O. l 87X,, + 0.066Xz, - 0.009X z, . 
SUMMARY 
OUTPUT 
Regression 
Statistics 
Multiple R 
R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Standard Error 
Observations 
AN OVA 
Regression 
Residual 
Total 
Intercept 
X2MART 
X4MOB 
X61ND 
* 
0.747341 
0.558518 
0.509465 
0.018936 
31 
df 
3 
27 
30 
Coefficients 
0.397708 
0.187397 
0.065535 
-0.009377 
( 3.08 ) ( 5.51 ) 
SS 
0.012248 
0.009681 
0.021929 
Standard 
Error 
0.059445 
0.060884 
0.011891 
0.015449 
MS 
0.004082 
3.58578E 
t Stat 
6.690259 
3.077908 
5.511203 
-0.606990 
*T-statistic 
(- 0 . 6 1 ) 
F Significance F 
11 .38592 5.25573E 
P-value Lower95% 
3.50859E 0.275735 
0.004742 0.062472 
7.73913E 0.041136 
0.548928 -0.041077 
Upper95% 
0.519681 
0.312322 
0.089934 
0.022322 
Once again, the same result was a chieved. The adjuste d 
r - square increased from 0 . 505 to 0 . 509 when the independent 
variabl e URBAN was removed. Therefore, it too will no longer 
be a p a rt of this model . 
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However, when the four th least independent variable from 
the first regression, MART, was dropped, the adjusted R-
squared decreased from 0.509 to 0.361. 
Y = 0.575 + 0.043X., - 0.009X: . . 
SUMMARY 
OUTPUT 
Regression 
Statistics 
Multiple R 
R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Standard Error 
Observations 
ANOVA 
Regression 
Residual 
Total 
Intercept 
X4MOB 
X61ND 
0.635307 
0.403615 
0.361017 
0.021612 
31 
df 
2 
28 
30 
Coefficients 
0.575735 
0.043086 
-0.034925 
* (4. 02) 
SS 
0.008851 
0.013078 
0.021929 
Standard 
Error 
0.015662 
0.010719 
0.014871 
*T-statistic 
(-2.35) 
MS 
0.004425 
4.67092E 
t Stat 
36.75803 
4.019573 
-2.348453 
F Significance F 
9.474804 7.20053E 
P-value Lower95% 
3.04984E 0.543651 
3.98713E 0.021129 
0.026142 -0.065389 
Upper95% 
0.607819 
0.065043 
-0.004462 
Therefore, MART will be kept in the model. The following 
model is the final model of this paper. 
Y = 0.398 + 0.187X1. + 0.066X2. -0.009Xi. 
*(3.08) (5.51) (-0.61) 
*T-statistic 
It was noted previously that the first regression had 
severe multicollinearity . Therefore, there is no way of 
knowing if the appropriate variables were dropped. However, 
the original correlation matrix shows that there is no 
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multicollinearity between the final three independent 
variables . Therefore, it appears that multicollinearity is 
not a problem in the final model. 
Before the three insignificant variables were dropped, 
the R-squared was 0.5724 and the adjusted R-square was 0.4655. 
The final model had a R-squared value of O. 5585 and an 
adjusted R-square value of 0 . 5095. This is significant 
because the difference between the R-square value and the 
adjusted R-square value has been narrowed. 
What did this paper accomplish? The final model (which 
included the mobility of non-whites, manufacturing, and 
martial statistics ratios of non-whites and whites) accounted 
for 55 . 85 percent of the income differences between the white 
and black races. The remaining 44.15 percent that was not 
accounted for may be due to discrimination. However, the 
remaining proportion could also be caused by the absence of 
other significant variables that were not used by this model 
or it could be caused by random factors. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The hypothesis for this model is tha t discrimi nation 
causes the income of non-whites to be less than the income of 
whites. As a consequence, non-whites are denied jobs in the 
p r i mary market where they are qualified . This paper 
hypothesizes the Civil Rights Act of 1964 decreased job 
discrimination. Al so, I hypothesize that since black 
education levels (used as a proxy for non-white job 
productivity) have increased, differences in income for whites 
a nd non - whi tes should have decr eased. Large differences 
between the incomes of non-whites and whites would indicate 
that job discrimination still exists. 
To discriminate i n the labor force means to refuse to 
hire someone because of their race, creed, religion, or other 
non-economic reason. I n short, it means that someone wi ll not 
be hired because the employer is discriminating. 
Sometimes people think that non-whites are dangerous or 
lazy. Prejudi ce prejudges a person before he or she is given 
a chance to prove himself or herself. Prejudice reduces 
economic efficiency because the most efficient person is not 
hi red. 
On November 27, 1992, PRIMETIME, a television show on 
35 
NBC, featured a story about discrimination. They recruited two 
young men, one white and one non-white; both went to the same 
employment agency to look for work. The white man was treated 
courteously while the non - white man was not treated 
courteously. The work opportunities offered to the non-white 
man were for menial jobs. When the African-American followed 
up one of the leads at a local dry cleaning establishment, an 
employee of the cleaning firm told him that the job had been 
filled . The white man also went to the same establishment and 
was told by a different employee that the job was open. Both 
men returned to the cleaning firm, and the non-white man was 
told again that the job had been filled, this time by the 
employee who had just told the white man that it was open. 
The white man was told later that the job was still open . l 
1 As an African-American, I have also experienced job discrimination. I graduated from a 
local junior college with an associate's degree in marketing and with a GPA of 3.97 based 
on a scale of 4.0. I applied for employment at several local banks but was not granted 
one interview. I was told that no jobs were available. A white female was hired, 
however, at one of the banks. This woman had been a classmate at the same college. The 
female was hired even though she had not graduated and thus was less qualified. Was there 
discrimination? I think so! However, there are other possible explanations such as she 
knowing someone at the bank. 
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Chapter one discussed a number of studies that dealt with 
income differences between non-whites and whites. Some of the 
income differences could not be accounted for. That is, 
assuming that the productivity between the two races is equal, 
then education, job experience, residence, secondary job 
employment, and other variables failed to explain income 
differences. 
Chapter 2 discussed the variables used to explain the 
relationships of income differences of white to nonwhite as 
the differences of education, unemployment, marital status, 
urban living, employment mobility and manufacturing to the 
nation' income. It then explained the tests used, their 
purpose and results and why changes in the tests were made. 
This last chapter will attempt to off er possible explanations 
why the results of the relationships shown by the tests 
differed from the predicted results. 
It cannot be argued that discrimination is residual in 
the regression equation mentioned above. I have hypothesized 
that the independent variables influence the ratio of non-
white to white median income. The independent variables 
themselves are affected by discrimination. If non-white 
income is low due to discrimination, then non-whites are 
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unable to afford higher education and the higher incomes 
associated with more education. In addition, discrimination 
through entrance examinations may keep non-whites from 
entering higher education and thus keep their incomes lower 
than white incomes. Discrimination that creates low income 
may make it difficult for non-whites to contemplate marriage 
and families. Thus discrimination may affect the variable X2. 
Discrimination may increase unemployment rates among non-
whites and thus reduce the ratio of non-white to white median 
incomes. Discrimination may affect mobility as well, either 
decreasing or increasing the variable depending on whether it 
impacts more on job security or the ability to move because of 
wealth levels . Thus discrimination may work through the 
independent variables . Discrimination, however, may work 
directly to reduce income rather than through the independent 
variables when non-whites are not given the chance to work 
where qualified . 
The ratio or percentage in income between races is the 
dependent variable, however, it is not a measurable way that 
discrimination can be revealed. There are other possible ways 
that discrimination can be shown such as: limited promotion of 
qualified non-whites, undesirable job placement, and 
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unbearable working conditions of jobs performed by non-whites. 
But gathering the data in these areas for measurement was not 
feasible. 
Income ratios as a unit of measurement are important. 
Since The Civil Rights Act of 1964, income differences due to 
job discrimination should have been eliminated. If two people 
are doing the same job and everything pertaining to the 
performance of that job is equal, then they should be paid the 
same. This is an important part of the Equal Opportunity Law, 
which is adjunct to the Civil Rights Act . This means that 
everyone should be rewarded equally for the same job. 
While differences in income are inevitable, everyone 
should be given the same opportunity to succeed. Accidents of 
birth, such as 'being born on the right side of the tracks' 
should not be the deciding factor when determining success. 
Equal opportunity means that something like race, creed, or 
religion should not be a factor that decides how much income 
a person earns. 
The ratio of the dependent variable remained constant 
with non-whites median income 58 percent of the white median 
income in 1960 . In 1990, the ratio was the same. 
Perhaps the quality of education is one explanation for 
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the inverse relationship of education to income. Investments 
in education can increase productivity of both the current 
and future periods; the latter because of the cumulative 
effect of education. 
education is important. 
So it seems that the quality of 
Even if the quantity of education 
levels between the black and white races are equal or even 
close to being equal, doesn't that mean that the quality of 
education is equal? 
Bussing was introduced because judges thought that 
segregation was unfair to black students. The black schools 
were inferior to white schools because the better teachers, 
books, and learning materials were placed in the white 
schools. Also teacher/student ratios were higher at the black 
schools than at white schools. Of course, one of the reasons 
for this was that more money per student was being spent at 
the white schools. 
According to the results of various studies, 
teachers of non-white students consistently performed at a 
lower level than teachers of white students. (1966 Ashenfelter 
et al., p. 68) 
Desegregation helped black students reduce the difference 
in the quality of education between the two races in some 
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areas by mixing the races, thus providing better teachers, 
materials, buildings, environment, etc., along with greater 
financial support. 
There is evidence that black students were starting to 
catch up with white students through desegregation as the 
differences in performance narrowed. (Ashenfelter et al, 1973, 
p. 72) 
Even if black and white students have the same amount of 
education, there may be significant differences because of 
quantity differences in funding and teacher preparation. Thi s 
could affect the productivity of black students. This 
suggests that black school s were discriminated against in 
funding. Of course, the lesser amount of funding may have been 
because non-whites did not own a lot of property and therefore 
paid very little in property taxes . 
Since non-whites owned little or no property, they were 
not allowed to have a voice in t he distribution of taxes to 
fund schooling. Therefore, they always came up short when the 
funding for black schools was decided . (Welch, 1967, p . 225) 
There was an inverse relationship of the unemployment 
ratio to the income ratio which was surprising. One 
expl anation for this could be the type o f jobs that non-whites 
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obtain. There is evidence that the labor market is made up of 
the independent primary segment, which consists of good-paying 
jobs such as managerial or professional jobs. Crafts such as 
electricians are also in this group. This segment offers good 
benefits and opportunities for advancement. The subordinate 
primary is another segment that offers good-paying jobs. An 
example of a subordinate primary job would be a teaching job 
in a high school. One major difference between this and the 
independent primary segment is that advancement in the 
subordinate primary depends mainly on tenure or seniority. 
These two segments have been typically composed of more whites 
than non-whites. 
Usually non-whites are employed in industries that pay 
the minimum wage. Opportunities for advancement are rare in 
these jobs. Examples of these types of jobs, called secondary 
segment jobs, are janitors or work in the fast food industry. 
If non-whites are to achieve income equality, they must 
obtain a higher proportion of the independent primary and the 
subordinate primary jobs and less of the secondary segment 
jobs. (Waddoups and Assane, 1972 p. 36) 
URBAN is another variable that was not expected to have 
an inverse relationship with the dependent variable . A reason 
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for this could be that non-whites in urban areas earn less 
than whites in urban areas. This could be because a number of 
good paying jobs that were found in large cities relocated to 
the suburbs. While these jobs are still located in urban 
areas, perhaps they are out of reach for most non-whites 
because they lack reliable transportation. Another reason 
could be that non-whites simply do not want to work a large 
distance from their homes and therefore do not attempt to 
obtain a higher paying job in the suburbs, especially the 
white suburbs. 
IND was the last variable that was not expected to have 
an inverse relationship with the dependent variable. However, 
there may be a simple reason for this. The ratio of 
manufacturing income relative to GDP fell from 27 percent in 
1960 to 18 percent in 1990. Therefore, manufacturing is a 
declining industry and consequently pay scales in this 
industry will decrease . Since the ratio of manufacturing 
income relative to the GDP has fallen consistently throughout 
the years, it would be logical to assume that the median 
income in this industry would also decrease. Therefore, if 
the ratio of non-whites relative to whites increases, the non-
white median incomes would decrease. 
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The disparity in income between races is harmful to 
whites in that businesses sometimes pay more than what they 
should to a white person. This increase in cost sometimes 
results in no increase in production. Therefore, this makes 
a firm less competitive. In the long run, if other firms hire 
qualified people regardless of their race and pay them 
according to their qualifications, their costs will be lower, 
and they will hopefully drive the discriminators out of 
business. 
How can this wage ratio between races be evened out? 
Listed below are some factors that may help if they are 
properly used. 
Education and contact with other racial groups are two 
ways to help change discriminatory practices. People need to 
be taught that people are people no matter what the color of 
their skin. We are all basically the same. No one racial 
group has more intelligence than any other racial group. 
There is no "master" race. If given the same education and 
job opportunities, an individual or a racial group can perform 
any job as well as an individual or any other racial group. 
This is certainly true when it comes to nationalities and 
females especially as time passes. 
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Contact with other racial groups is also essential if we 
are to eliminate racial practices. Being around or 
socializing with a different racial groups would reinforce the 
idea that we are all basically alike. People would see the 
foolishness in thinking that all non-whites are dumb, for 
example. People would see that they share common interests and 
goals. Also, in the right atmosphere they would realize that 
to consider only one racial group for a certain job would be 
doing an injustice to themselves. 
Government intervention could be utilized to eliminate 
the potential discrimination coefficient . Since affirmative 
action has not been very successful in seeing that 
discrimination does not occur by sex, race, or national 
origin, perhaps something else needs to be done. In fact, 
some white males, who in the past have received the benefit of 
discrimination, have recently filed reverse discrimination 
suits when the discrimination was not to their benefit. Also, 
some members who by either race or religion have been 
discriminated against have taken advantage of affirmative 
action by receiving promotions and raises they have not earned 
or deserved. 
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A potential solution would be that companies could be 
required by the government to document why a particular person 
was hired, given a promotion, or received a raise. 
Information that was used to make this decision would have to 
be kept for a certain period of time and used as primarily 
evidence when required. This information would include data 
on all of the applicants who applied for the job or promotion. 
Employers would have to say what factors made them come to a 
particular decision. In essence, the best person for the job 
would be awarded the position. This regulation could be 
enforced by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 
Penalties could be civil penalties. This government 
enforcement would give all persons the incentive to qualify 
themselves for particular positions. Affirmative action can 
sometimes create a disincentive for one to continue one's 
education if the minority member feels that he or she will 
receive a position or promotion regardless of their 
qualifications or lack of qualifications. 
efforts made so this does not happen. 
There has to be 
Also, this oversight power by the government would help 
to further eliminate the educational differences between 
races. As non-whites began to realize that education would 
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benefit them, more would continue their education. This would 
have a domino effect as their children and their children's 
children would encourage their children to earn degrees and 
advanced degrees. 
In addition to these benefits, perhaps better treatment 
of minorities in the labor force would improve race relations. 
This in turn could lead to increased production. Better 
production could lead to more profits for business owners. 
More profits could improve the economy . In short, everyone 
could benefit if this income disparity were eliminated. 
This paper can not separate out individual influences to 
determine a discrimination value, if in fact there is 
discrimination . There are income differences but how much can 
be ascribed to discrimination is impossible to determine by 
this study because of the problem of multicollinearity and the 
potential problem of autocorrelation. With greater 
refinements of information and added information, there is a 
possibility that a discrimination va l ue can be determined by 
the methods used. 
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Appendix 1 
All of the following information is from the Statistical Abstract of the United States. 
The following information will list the year and table the information was derived from . 
Education Industry Marital 
1960 1964 Table 146 1969 Table 325 1962 Table 41 
1961 1964 Table 146 1969 Table 325 1962 Table 41 
1962 1964 Table 147 1969 Table 325 1963 Table 43 
1963 1964 Table 147 1969 Table 325 1964 Table 38 
1964 1964 Table 148 1969 Table 325 1965 Table 38 
1965 1966 Table 155 1969 Table 325 1966 Table 40 
1966 1967 Table 156 1969 Table 325 1967 Table 40 
1967 1968 Table 156 1969 Table 325 1968 Table 44 
1968 1969 Table 152 1969 Table 325 1969 Table 4S 
1969 1970 Table 1S4 1969 Table 32S 1970 Table 42 
1970 1971 Table 162 1976 Table 602 1971 Table 46 
1971 1972 Table 169 1976 Table 602 1972 Table 49 
1972 1973 Table 17S 1979 Table 687 1973 Table S2 
1973 1974 Table 187 1977 Table 662 1974 Table S3 
1974 1975 Table 191 1977 Table 662 1975 Table S2 
1975 1976 Table 198 1977 Table 662 1976 Table S3 
1976 1977 Table 217 1977 Table 662 1977 Table S9 
1977 1978 Table 226 1978 Table 681 1978 Table 60 
1978 1979 Table 231 1979 Table 687 1979 Table 62 
1979 1980 Table 238 1980 Table 697 1980 Table 66 
1980 1981 Table 231 1981 Table 67S 1981 Table 61 
1981 1982-83 Table 226 1982-83 Table 651 1982-83 Table 65 
1982 1984 Table 222 1984 Table 696 1984 Table 61 
1983 1985 Table 214 198S Table 676 1985 Table SS 
1984 1986 Table 216 1986 Table 680 1986 Table 57 
198S 1987 Table 198 1987 Table 658 1987 Table 64 
1986 1988 Table 202 1988 Table 627 1988 Table 58 
1987 1989 Table 212 1989 Table 642 1989 Table 60 
1988 1990 Table 217 1990 Table 64S 1990 Table 57 
1989 1992 Table 220 1991 Table 6S2 1991 Table 58 
1990 1992 Table 220 1992 Table 629 1992 Table 57 
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Urban Income Unemployment 
1960 1971 Table 15 1962 Table 447 1963 Table 290 
1961 1971 Table 15 1963 Table 454 1963 Table 290 
1962 1971 Table 15 196 -i Table 459 1964 Table 293 
1963 1971 Table 15 1965 Table 4 72 1 965 Table 300 
1964 1971 Table 15 1966 Table 477 1965 Table 300 
1965 1971 Table 15 1967 Table 4 72 1965 Table 300 
1966 1971 Table 15 1968 Table 472 1967 Table 317 
1967 1971 Table 15 1970 Table 473 1967 Table 317 
1968 1971 Table 15 1970 Table 486 1970 Table 321 
1969 1971 Table 15 1971 Table 500 1971 Table 335 
1970 1973 Table 17 1972 Table 533 1972 Table 351 
1971 1973 Table 17 1973 Table S43 1973 Table 3S8 
1972 1974 Table 16 1974 Table S70 1974 Table SSS 
1973 1982-83 Table 24 197S Table S90 1974 Table 55S 
1974 1982-83 Table 24 197S Table 639 1975 Table 571 
197S 1982 -83 Table 24 1976 Table 66 4 1976 Table 582 
1976 1982-83 Table 24 1978 Table 747 1977 Table 642 
1977 1982-83 Table 24 1978 Table 747 1978 Table 667 
1978 1982-83 Table 24 1980 Table 763 1979 Table 671 
1979 1982-83 Tabl e 24 1980 Table 704 1980 Table 682 
1980 1982-83 Table 24 1981 Table 782 1981 Table 661 
1981 1982- 83 Table 24 1982-83 Tabl e 713 1982-83 Table 6S6 
1982 1982-83 Table 24 1984 Table 782 1984 Table 699 
1983 1982-83 Table 24 l98S Table 736 198S Table 680 
1984 1982-83 Table 24 1986 Table 743 1986 Table 684 
198S 1982-83 Table 24 1987 Table 731 1989 Table 647 
1986 1982-83 Table 24 1988 Table 651 1989 Table 647 
1987 1982-83 Table 24 1989 Table 724 1989 Table 647 
1988 1982 -83 Table 24 1990 Table 716 1990 Table 6S2 
1989 1982 -83 Table 24 1991 Table 721 1991 Table 6S9 
1990 1982-83 Tabl e 24 1992 Table 69S 1992 Table 63S 
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Appendix 2 
Data 
X1ED X5UNEM X61ND X2MART X3URBAN X4MOB y 
1960A 0. 752293578 2.04 0.828751161 0.866673 1.041668 0 0.588190 
1961A 0.752293578 2.083333 0.828751161 0.866673 1.041668 0 0.522082 
1962.A 0.728813559 2.244897 0.828751161 0.814408 1.041668 0 0.533910 
1963A 0. 728813559 2.137254 0.828751161 0.806965 1.041668 0 0.529169 
1964A 0.741666667 2.130434 0.828751161 0.830335 1 041668 0 0.560601 
1965A 0.75 1.803921 0.828751161 0.825098 1.041668 0.553835 
1966A 0.743801653 2.205882 0.828751161 0.818412 1.041668 0.599326 
1967A 0.752066116 2.257142 0.828751161 0.815872 1.041668 0.621343 
1968A 0. 768595041 2.09375 0.828751161 0.778130 1.041668 0.625489 
1969A 0.786885246 2.064516 0.828751161 0.773773 1.041668 0.632121 
1970A 0. 786885246 1.822222 0.997643612 0.785985 1.122785 0.614526 
1971A 0 827868852 1.833333 0.997643612 0.762783 1.122785 0.606288 
1972A 0.853658537 2 0.934929178 0.744082 1.122785 0.583664 
1973A 0.861788618 2.069767 0.934929178 0.719969 1.122785 0.588623 
1974A 0.862903226 1.98 0.09349585 0.728453 1.122785 0.594757 
1975A 0.879032258 1.782051 0.09349585 0.735501 1.122785 .0.600324 
1976A 0.89516129 1.871428 0.934929178 0 702314 1.122785 0.594627 
1977A 0.912 2.112903 0.934929178 0.713998 1.122785 0.590106 
1978A 0.936 2.288461 0.934929178 0.689671 1.122785 0.600957 
1979A 0.952 2.215686 0. 934929178 0.686411 1.122785 0.567944 
1980A 0.967741935 2.095238 1.122104498 0.692301 1.197536 0.578615 
1981A 0.96031746 2.119402 1.039037522 0.630926 1.197536 0.564102 
1982A 0.968253968 2.197674 1.193398779 0.652413 1.197536 0.552696 
1983A 0.968253968 2.321428 1.190145563 0.630049 1.197536 0.563571 
1984A 0.968253968 2.446153 1.187958357 0.611559 1.197536 0.557393 
1985A 0.968503937 2.435483 1.176936769 0.609996 1.197536 0.575809 
1986A 0.968503937 2.416666 1.213908271 0.634618 1.197536 0.575826 
1987A 0.976377953 2.452830 1.1848577 44 0.632625 1.197536 0.568357 
1988A 0.976377953 2.489361 1 . 184486846 0.616416 1.197536 0.569922 
1989A 0.976377953 2.533333 1.197737562 0.604683 1.197536 0.561750 
1990A 0.976377953 2.404255 1.199314995 0.604683 1.197536 0.580333 
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